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SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1948

EVIDENCE
CONFESSIONS

INDUCED

BY PHYSICAL VIOLENCE -

SUBSEQUENT

DISCOVERY OF FACTS WHICH CONDUCE TO ESTABLISH GUILT

T

HE recent case of Holt v. State' reiterates and confirms the
Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in Colley v. State,2 decided in 1942, with regard to exclusion of involuntary confessions
even though confirmed by facts discovered through the confession. In the Holt case, the defendant was arrested in Jefferson
County, and whipped and beaten until he confessed to burglary
in Hardin County. He was turned over to the Sheriff of Hardin
County and made another confession through use of which the
stolen goods were found. This confession was admitted on the
theory of subsequently discovered facts corroborating the confession.
On rehearing, it was urged that the confession was not voluntary-that officers of Jefferson County had told the defendant that
if he did not make the second confession, they would bring him
back and repeat the whippings-and that the confession was
made under fear of further violence. In reversing, the Court said:
"Article 727, Code of Criminal Procedure, permitting use of a confession where, in connection with such confession, the accused makes statements of fact or circumstances that are found to be true, which conduce
to establish his guilt, has no application when a confession is obtained
as the result of physical or mental pain."'

It is obvious that there may be, and in the cases here considered is, conflict between the two rules involved, i.e., the rule excluding confessions obtained through physical violence, and that
admitting confessions and the facts discovered through them
...- Tex. Crim. Rep .. 208 S.W. (2d) 643 (1948).
143 Tex. Crim. Rep. 390, 158 S. W. (2d) 1014 (1942).
8 208 S. W. (2d) 643, 646 (1948).
3

2

SOUTHWESTERN LAF JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

which point to the defendant's guilt, even though the confession
was involuntary.
In the Colley case, this conflict was pointed out, and the court,
in ruling the confession inadmissible, stated that if the case of
Bryant v. State,4 and similar cases,5 be construed to the contrary,
they were thereby modified so as to conform with the present
opinion, or, if necessary, overruled.
Prior to the time of the Colley case, the rule would appear to
have been different. The Bryant case is representative. It was there
held that a confession obtained by force was admissible if in connection therewith, defendant made statements which led to the
finding of the stolen property.
The only possible distinction between these rules would seem
to lie in their employment of the terms "by force" and "physical
or mental pain". However it is submitted that no valid distinction
may be drawn irmsmuch as the broad term "by force" necessarily
comprehends and includes the latter term.
In anticipation of possible future rulings clarifying this issue,
it is useful to analyze the underlying policy for the exclusion
of involuntary confessions. The general rule is that confessions
obtained through the use of threats, fear or physical violence are
inadmissible. The basic reason is that such confessions are
deemed untrustworthy as testimony.6 The courts have concluded
that when a person is subjected to certain stresses, he may falsely
acknowledge guilt in order to gain a temporary advantage. An
ancillary reason is the policy of the courts to discourage "third
degree" methods by the police force, and for the protection of the
public from such methods. The theory is that if confessions so
obtained are held automatically inadmissible, police officers will
cease to employ such tactics.
In applying these principles to the instant case, it would seem
4 131 Tex. Crim. Rep. 274,98 S. W. (2d) 189 (1936).

Brooks v. State, 130 Tex. Crim. Rep. 561, 95 S. W. (2d) 136 (1936) ; Warren v.
State, 130 Tex. Crim. Rep. 456, 94 S. W. (2d) 463 (1936).
6 MCCOPMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW oF EvIDENCE § 529 (1937).

